There is a small, but growing, economics literature on the importance and e¤ects of having monetary policy made by a committee, rather than by an individual. Complimenting this is an older and larger body of literature on groups in the other social sciences, particular in social psychology. This paper provides a review of some of this work, focusing on two important features of committees: the e¤ect of their size on performance and whether or not they are more moderate than the members who make them up.
Abstract
There is a small, but growing, economics literature on the importance and e¤ects of having monetary policy made by a committee, rather than by an individual. Complimenting this is an older and larger body of literature on groups in the other social sciences, particular in social psychology. This paper provides a review of some of this work, focusing on two important features of committees: the e¤ect of their size on performance and whether or not they are more moderate than the members who make them up.
Individual members of a committee acquire idiosyncratic information which the committee uses to make a decision. A result of the famous Condorcet Jury Theorem is that larger committees have more resources, in the form of more information, and are thus better than smaller ones. This result depends on individuals being willing to work as hard at gathering information when they are members of a committee as they would be willing to work if they were acting alone. The economics literature suggests that this may not hold; that individual members may have an incentive to shirk. This phenomenon of a member withholding e¤ort is called social loa…ng in the social pyschology literature. Studies stretching over 125 years document its existence and suggest that it becomes more important as committee size increases and that it disappears when individual members' contributions can be identi…ed and evaluated. The Condorcet Jury Theorem also depends on the committee being able to aggregate members'information and on members being willing to truthfully reveal their information. An excessively formal meeting structure may cause the former to fail to hold; committee members with di¤erent objectives may cause the latter not to be true. As a result of shirking and coordination problems, smaller committees may be better than larger ones and the optimal size for a committee is an empirical issue.
Committees pool members'information and views, thus it seems that monetary policy made by a committee should be more moderate than monetary policy made by a single individual. However, several hundred studies demonstrate that belonging to a committee polarizes its members and, hence, committees may be more extreme than individuals. A particularly harmful form of group polarization occurs when committee members'striving for consensus causes them to stop paying su¢ cient attention to alternative courses of action. In this case the committee may make terrible decisions that none of its members would have made on their own.
The results of the literature on committee size and committee polarization suggest that the ideal monetary policy committee may not have many more than …ve members. It should have a well de…ned objective and it should publish the votes of its members. It should be structured so that members do not act as part of a group, perhaps by having short terms in o¢ ce and members from outside the central bank. External scrutiny of the decision-making process should be encouraged.
They sit there in committees day after day, And they each put in a color and it comes out gray. And we all have heard the saying, which is true as well as witty, That a camel is a horse that was designed by a committee. " Allan Sherman "Deliver us from committees." Robert Frost
Introduction
The past decade has seen a shift from monetary policy making by individuals to monetary Until recently the economics literature had little to say on this issue. However, the past few years has seen the development of a small but growing body of work on the signi…cance of monetary policy making by groups, instead of by individuals. Existing alongside this work is a far older and more voluminous literature on groups in the other disciplines, most importantly in social psychology but also in sociology, organizational behaviour and legal studies. The intent of this paper is to review some of the current economics literature and some of the literature in other disciplines, to see in what ways it suggests that committees are bene…cial or harmful and to uncover the lessons this work has for monetary policy committees. I will focus on two important aspects of committees: how their performance varies with their size and whether or not they tend to be more moderate than the individuals who comprise them.
An obvious question is whether groups or individuals are better at performing tasks. If groups are better, are large groups always better than small groups, or is there an optimal 2 size for a group? I consider these questions from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view, surveying the literature from both economics and the other social sciences. I begin with a discussion of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which suggests that larger committees are better than smaller committees as they have access to more resources (in the form of information).
An assumption of the Condorcet Jury Theorem is that committee members acquire resources e¤ortlessly. If this is not true, then members of a committee may have an incentive to exert less e¤ort than they would have if they were acting alone, a phenomenon known as free riding to economists and social loa…ng to social psychologists. I review the theoretical literature -which provides reasons for free riding -and the emprical literature which documents the phenomenon and suggests that the tendency to free ride is greater, the larger is the committee.
Two other hypotheses of the Condorcet Jury Theorem are that committees can costlessly pool information and that their members have an incentive to reveal their information truthfully. The e¤ect of abandoning these assumptions has been surveyed elsewhere -see Gerling,
Grüner, Kiel and Schulte (2003) -but, I will brie ‡y discuss why these assumptions may not hold and the consequent e¤ects. I will suggest some of the possible policy implications of these coordination problems for monetary policy.
The trade o¤ between the greater resources enjoyed by larger committees and the costs of the increased tendency to reduce e¤ort as the size of the committee is increased, as well as coordination problems in larger groups, implies that the optimal size for a committee is an empirical issue. I survey the empirical literature measuring committee productivity and committee member satisfaction as a function of committee size.
Committees aggregate the views and information of their individual members. Does the aggregation process make committees more moderate or cautious than individuals? This would appear to be the view from the economics literature. However, joining a group and participating in the deliberation process may change the way that individuals behave and 3 this leads to a di¤erent view in the social psychology literature. Participating in a committee tends to make committee members more extreme, a phenomenon known as group polarization. I survey the literature from the social sciences documenting this process. 
Committee Performance and Committee Size
In this section I review the literature comparing the ability of groups and individuals to perform tasks. I examine the e¤ect of committee size on performance and the implications for the desirable size for a monetary policy committee.
Condorcet' s Jury Theorem
Monetary policy committees are typically faced with a situtation where they must choose between two alternatives, say, leaving interest rates unchanged or changing them by 25 basis points in an obvious direction. This scenario is an example of the dichotomous choice model, …rst described by Condorcet (1785) Suppose that a committee has an odd number of members, n, and that each of the members receives an independent noisy signal about which alternative is best. Members are equally competent in that it is equally likely that each receives a correct signal and the signals are informative: each member's signal is more likely to be correct than not. Members vote according to their signals. Condorcet stated that if the committee makes decisions by majority rule, then the committee is more likely to pick the best option than any of its members, acting on the basis of his information alone, and as the number of committee members goes to in…nity, the probability that the committee selects the best outcome goes monotonically to one. These two results were …rst proved by Condorcet's contemporary, Laplace, in 1812 and together are referred to as the Condorcet Jury Theorem. 2 Real world committees have have di¤erent abilities and Berend and Sapir (forthcoming) extend Condorcet's model to allow for di¤erent competencies: they assume that the signal of member i; i = 1; :::; n, is correct with probability p i 1=2. It is assumed that decisions are made by majority rule and the authors demonstrate that for any competency structure (p 1 ; ::; p n ), the probability that a randomly selected subcommittee with an odd number of members chooses the best alternative is increasing in the the number of its members.
Berend and Sapir's results are clearly not true for non-randomly selected subcommittees. Karotkin and Paroush (2003) address the question of whether adding two additional members to a committee is bene…cial, if doing so would reduce the compentency of the committee.
They provide a necessary condition for adding two members of given competencies to a committee of members with given competencies to increase the probability of a correct choice by the committee.
The Condorcet Jury Theorem depends on its assumptions that it is costless for members to acquire information and that the committee is able to costlessly aggregate the information acquired by its members. In subsections 2.2 and 2.3 I discuss the theoretical and empirical literature where the …rst of these assumptions is abandoned; in subsection 2.4 I brie ‡y review the literature where the second of these assumptions is abandoned. Finally, in subsection 2.5 I consider the empirical literature relating committee size to committee performance and suggest the proper size for a monetary policy committee. 2 The assertion that Laplace provided the original proof is due to Heyde (1983). 5 
Free riding in committees
An important assumption of the Condorcet model is that information is costless to obtain.
In reality, the acquisition of information entails e¤ort, and thus is costly. If the information can be shared, then it is a public good and this creates a free-rider problem for committees.
A number of authors have addressed this issue. An example (in the spirit of Mukhopadhaya's (1999) model of juries and formally presented in Sibert (2005)) of how the free-rider problem can cause large committees to do worse than small committees is as follows.
A monetary policy committee must choose between leaving monetary policy unchanged or changing it; the correct decision depends on the unobservable state of the economy.
Members' prior beliefs are that it is equiprobable each of the options is the best choice.
By expending e¤ort, a member can acquire additional independent information about which option is best. Speci…cally, if the member expends e¤ort he observes an independent random draw from a normal distribution with a known variance. The distribution has mean zero if leaving policy unchanged is the best option and a known non-zero mean if changing policy is the best option. There is no con ‡ict over objectives; all members …nd type one and type two errors equally costly and information can be costlessly pooled.
Con ‡ict arises because information is a public good and it is costly to attain. The members of the committee play a Game of Chicken: each member would prefer to become informed, rather than have the committee be completely uninformed; however, each member's most preferred outcome is for the other members to expend e¤ort becoming informed, while he free rides. Using elementary sampling theory it can be demonstrated that the expected loss to the committee from choosing the wrong policy is decreasing and convex in the number of members who choose to become informed. The outcome is that it is possible that for su¢ ciently small committees, all members will choose to become informed. However, as a result of the decreasing returns to committee members becoming informed, there is some committee size beyond which committee members will randomise their decision to become informed. This result is not su¢ cient to ensure that adding committee members worsens 6 matters. Although individuals are less apt to become informed, there are more members who can potentially be informed. However, it is easy to construct examples where larger committees are more apt to choose the wrong decision than are small committees.
Free-riding problems can occur in committees for other reasons as well. Sibert (2005) adds multiple agents to the career-concerns framework of Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) to demonstrate that larger committees may be less productive than smaller committees because the larger is the committee the less its output is associated with any particular member's input and this can reduce an individual's incentive to exert e¤ort. In general, the output of a committee results from a collective e¤ort. Whan an individual's costly contribution to the e¤ort cannot be distinguished and evaluated, a moral hazard problem results.
Social loa…ng
Consistent with economists'predictions that committee members have an incentive to free ride, a salient feature of real world committees is that their output is not good as one might expect, given the capabilities of the individuals who comprise them. 3 Surveying the literature on group performance, Kerr and Tindale (2003) report that, "The ubiquitous …nding across many decades of research ... is that groups usually fall short of reasonable productivity baselines ... they exhibit process losses."
Consider a group assigned a simple additive task, such as pulling on a rope, addressing envelopes, or producing noise by yelling. Assuming that there are no coordination problems and that individuals' e¤orts do not depend on the size of the group, then group output should rise linearly as additional group members are added. However, if individuals tend to shirk when they are part of a group and if an individual's incentive to shirk is increasing in the number of group members, then group performance will be a concave function of the number of members and it may decrease beyond some point. Social psychologists refer to individuals'reduced e¤ort when they are part of a group as social loa…ng. On the other hand, 3 A notable exception to this is the committee which translated the King James bible.
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there is an optimistic view that in some situations individuals might pull together and work harder when they are part of a group, in this case there may be a range over which adding members increases group output per member. For over 125 years, social psychologists and others have attempted to study the e¤ect of group size on individuals' incentives to exert e¤ort when they are part of a group.
In experiments mostly conducted in the 1880s, the French agricultural engineer Max
Ringelmann had his subjects pull on a rope as hard as they could. 4 A problem with the social psychology literature for economists is that most of the work does not consider tasks that are similar to monetary policy making. There are exceptions.
Henningsen, Cruz and Miller (2000), for example, had 189 participants work either alone or in 4-person or 8-person groups. Each participant was asked to read information for the 4 The experiments are described in Parks and Sanna (1999). 5 Ingham, Levinger, Graves and Peckham (1974) later veri…ed that the concavity of performance as a function of size was not due entirely to coordination problems instead of shirking. In their experiments all of the rope pullers were blind folded and all except the one at the head of the line were confederates who had been briefed not to pull. Other researchers, such as Latané, Williams and Harkins (1979) Team and staged a "meet" with prizes. They found that relay team swimmers swam laps faster than individuals when times were announced, but slower when they were not. George (1992) used a survey methodology and found that sales people working in groups for a large US retailer engaged in social loa…ng, but that social loa…ng and perceived task visibility were negatively related.
A study by Harkins and Jackson (1985) suggested that it is not indenti…ability per se that reduces social loa…ng, but the ability to evaluate individuals' performance. In their experiments, Harkins and Jackson gave four-person groups brainstorming tasks: to identify uses for di¤erent objects. Half of the groups were led to believe that their responses were identi…able; the other half were told that their responses were not identi…able. In addition, half of the groups were told that everyone was generating uses for the same object while half were told that groups were generating uses for di¤erent objects. Only when both identi…a-bility and comparability were present -so that evaluation was possible -was social loa…ng eliminated.
Another variable that may lessen social loa…ng is group cohesiveness. Social psychologists de…ne group cohesiveness as the appeal that group members have for each other. It is a function of group homogeneity, the amount of communication between members, the size of the group, outside pressure, the status of the group and past success. 6 Karau and Williams (1997) did two sets of experiments using dyads made up of friends and dyads made up 6 See Sanna and Parks (1999) and Buchanan and Huczynski (1997) for a discussion of this.
9 of strangers. In the …rst, secretarial students typed both individually and collectively in simulated word-processing pools and in the second set of experiments groups worked apart or together on an idea-generation task. Both sets of studies supported the hypothesis that social loa…ng is lower in cohesive groups. Karau and Hart (1998) generated di¤erent levels of cohesiveness in laboratory groups by having 59 dyads discuss a controversial issue and then work, both apart and together on an idea-generation task. They de…ned a groups cohesiveness as the strength of agreement that the group had on the issue and found that groups with low-cohesiveness experienced social loa…ng while groups with high cohesiveness worked as hard together as they did apart.
The literature on social loa…ng has some policy implications for monetary policy committees. One is that it can be reduced if members contributions can be both identi…ed and
evaluated. An obvious way to identify contributions is to publish members'votes. Publication is not enough for evaluation; the public needs some way of evaluating an individual's votes. One way to do this is to give the committee a clearly de…ned goal. If the goal is ambiguous, the public might be unsure whether votes that turned out to be consistent with -say -too high in ‡ation, were a result of incompetence or an objective function that put a lot of weight on some factor other than in ‡ation. Another implication is that social loa…ng is more likely to occur in large monetary policy committees than in small ones. Thus, it would appear to be especially important for large committees to identify the contributions of individuals and to be as speci…c as possible about their goals. Sah and Stiglitz (1988) consider corporate committees which must decide to approve or not approve projects. They …nd the optimal committee size when members have a limited ability to share their decentralized information and it is costly to add additional committee members. Ley and Steel (1998) show that if information exchange is costly, with the cost depending on the committee size, and information is correlated then the more highly correlated is the idiosyncratic information, the smaller is the optimal committee size. there is no equilibrium where committee members tell the truth. If a member believed that the other member would tell the truth, he would have an incentive to shade his own information to tilt the decision toward his own preferred outcome. They argue that information sharing requires voting; that the fear of being pivotal limits the incentive to misprepresent information. However, even with voting members are tempted into manipulation and counter-manipulation. The more that committee members can be induced to weight type I and type II errors equally -and thus come closer to sharing preferences -the less is the incentive to misrepresent the truth and the better is information sharing.
The policy advice from the …rst of the previous two papers is that meetings should be structured to avoid information cascades; perhaps this is best done by avoiding large committees with an excessively formal meeting structure. The advice from the second is that information is more easily shared if objectives are similar across members. Perhaps this can be accomplished with a formal goal of a point target with a symmetric weighting of deviations from the target.
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What is the optimal size for a monetary policy committee?
Analysing the optimal size for a committee is di¢ cult without a precise speci…cation of the nature of the committee's tasks. Types of tasks typically analysed by social pyschologists are additive tasks, disjunctive tasks and conjunctive tasks. Additive tasks, as previously mentioned, are ones where the group's potential performance, is the sum of individual potential performances performances. Disjunctive tasks are tasks where the group's potential performance depends on that of its most competent member. Examples are groups that must come up with a solution to a problem. Conjunctive tasks are tasks where the group's potential performance depends on that of its least competent member; these are groups where every member must complete a task, such as climbing a mountain. 9 With conjunctive groups, increasing the size of the group increases the likelihood of an especially incompetent member. This coupled with a tendancy to engage in social loa…ng and coordination problems means that such groups should be as small as possible. One would expect that if adding additional members is costless, then in the absence of social loa…ng or coordination problems, additive groups and disjunctive groups should be as large as possible.
With social loa…ng and coordination problems, there is a trade o¤ between the bene…ts of increased resources (in additive groups) and an increased chance of an especially competent member (in disjunctive groups) and increased costs associated with coordination problems and with losses due to social loa…ng. The optimal size of such a group is then an empirical issue. Frank and Anderson (1971) studied two-, three-, …ve-and eight-member groups and found what appears to be both the expected and the typical result that large groups tended to be better at disjunctive tasks and small groups tend to be better at conjunctive tasks. The 100 subjects -who were mainly Princeton undergraduates -knew nothing about the model's speci…cation, although they did understand basic macroeconomics. The authors divided the subjects into …ve-person groups and had them play four sets of ten rounds. In the …rst round they played as individuals; in the second they played as groups, half the groups making decisions by majority rule and half by unanimous consent; in the third round they played as individuals again and in the fourth round they played as groups again, exchanging the method by which they had made decisions in round two. It was found that the …ve-person groups were signi…cantly better at the task than were the individuals.
Lombardelli, Proudman and Talbot (2005) performed similar experiments using students from the LSE. They found that the average …ve-person committee's performance was signi…cantly better than the average of their individual members'performances, although not better than the performance of their best member.
In related work with a di¤erent methodology, Brocato, Kumar and Smith (1989) came to a di¤erent conclusion. They examined forecasting by groups versus forecasting by individuals.
They studied a medium-sized multinational petroleum marketing and re…ning organisation where a committee of six upper-level executives predicted spot petroleum prices 45 days later every two weeks. They compared these predictions with predictions of the executives in a laboratory setting where they were presented with what the executives had noted as the relevant fundamentals from di¤erent time periods and asked to make forecasts. The researchers found that the individual forecasts were markedly superior to the group forecasts.
They postulated that some of their result may have been due to social loa…ng and some to coordination problems involving the way that the group interacted, which led to entertaining irrelevant information.
As it is di¢ cult to measure the performance of many groups, including monetary policy committees, one approach to determining the optimal size of a committee has been to assign committees tasks and to then ask members whether they felt that the committee was too small or too large for the task it was given. In a famous early study, Slater (1958) studied 24 groups of two to seven male undergraduates whe were given analytical problems to discuss and to suggest solutions to. He asked the group members whether their group was too large or too small to get the best results and found that groups of size …ve did the best, receiving signi…cantly fewer complaints of being too small than groups of size four and signi…cantly fewer complaints of being too big than groups of size six. Members of larger groups felt that their groups were disorderly and wasted time and that members were too pushy and competitive. Members of smaller groups did not give reasons for their dissatisfaction; Slater speculated that the members of small groups disliked overt con ‡ict.
In a similar experiment, Lundgren and Bogart (1974) divided students in Introductory
Psychology at the University of Cincinnati in 1970 into small (5-member) and large (15-member) groups. The students were told to discuss and reach consensus on a series of attitude statements concerning societal change. They found that students in the small groups expressed greater satisfaction with their experience than students in the large groups.
Perhaps the reasons behind the the above results follow from the way that groups interact.
Very small groups have the common problem that members tend to avoid dissent. There are idiosyncratic features as well: dyads can be e¢ cient (parents are an example), but often there is considerable tension between members; triads are unstable (as anyone who has lived in a three-child household can attest to); four-person groups tend to split into pairs.
Five-person groups appear to be liked because they allow for discussion and a diversity of opinion as well as allowing for a majority decision. 10 Beyond seven to nine members, the participation of members decrease and members become less satis…ed. Groups of over twelve people …nd mutural interaction di¢ cult. 11 As size increases so do motivational losses and coordination problems become more important. There is no consensus on the optimal size for a group solving problems or making judgements, but …ve person groups appear to be especially popular. Napier and Gershenfeld (1999), for example, claim that, "a group of …ve seems to be optimal in a number of situations."
As a consequence of most of the above evidence, it appears that monetary policy committees should probably have at least …ve members, but they should not be much larger.
The Bank of England's MPC with its nine members may be slightly too large; the 12-person 
Extreme Views in Committees
Committees are the subjects of endless jokes and comments, where they are depicted as conservative and cautious. Lee Iacocca (1984, p. 52), for example, commented that, "By the time the committee is ready to shoot, the duck has ‡own away ." In this section I examine whether or not this view is warranted.
Are committees more moderate than single policy makers?
It appears to be a common view among academic economists and policy makers that mon- While serving on the FOMC, I was vividly reminded of a few things all of us probably know about committees; that they laboriously aggregate individual preferences; that they need to be led; that they tend to adopt compromise positions on di¢ cult questions; and -perhaps because of all of the above -that they tend to be inertial.
Economists see committees as moderate and slow moving because they view committee decisions as re ‡ecting a weighted average of the views of individuals who make up the committee and (at least a partial) pooling of the these individuals'idiosyncratic information.
Participation in the committee is not seen as changing committee members' preferences.
Akerlof (1991), however, argues that a more modern view of behaviour, based on research in other social science disciplines, is that individuals'utility functions change over time and that the changes can be unforeseen and even unrecognized. One of the situations that can percipitate a dramatic change in utility is membership in a group.
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Social pyschologists have long believed that belonging to a group can have a profound e¤ect on group members' preferences; group members behave di¤erently when they are part of a group then when they act on their own. Over …fty years ago, the famous social pyschologist Solomon Asch demonstrated this in a series of classic experiments detailed in Asch (1951) . In these experiments, college students were formed into groups of eight and were shown two cards; the …rst had a vertical bar, the second had three vertical bars of varying heights. The students were told that Asch was studying visual perception and they were each asked to guess in turn which of the three bars on the second card was of the same height as the vertical bar on the …rst card. The correct answer to this question was obvious. Unbeknownst to the last student in each group to answer the question in each of the experiments, the seven other students were previously briefed confederates of the author.
In one third of the experiments the confederates were instructed to give the correct answer; in these trials this yielded a unanimous correct response from the entire group. In the other two-thirds of the experiments the confederates were told to give the incorrect response.
When faced with a unanimous and obviously wrong answer from the confederates who had previously responded, the real subject went along with the erroneous answer one third of the time. Asch commented, "The tendency to conformity in our society is so strong that reasonably intelligent and well-meaning young people are willing to call white black."
In another set of experiments, Muzafer Sherif (1937) had members of seven dyads observe a pinpoint of light in a dark room. If one does this, there is an optical illusion called the "autokinetic e¤ect" which makes the light seem to move. Both members in turn were asked to stare at the light for two seconds and then report where it had moved. This was repeated until there were 50 responses from each individual. Unbeknownst to one member of each group, the other member was a confederate who had been briefed about how far to say the light was moving. For example, in one group the informed subject had been told to always give a distance between one and three inches, in another the informed subject was told to always say between two and four inches. Sherif de…ned the group's norm to be the range given to the confederate. The entire experiment was then repeated with just the naive subjects. It was found that in the …rst set of experiments, both members of each dyad tended to say that they saw the light within the group's prescribed range -even though there was no real movement of the light at all. In the second set of experiments, the naive subjects tended even more strongly to see the light move in the range that had been given to the informed subject in their dyad in the …rst set of experiments.
In another famous early work, Stoner (1961) compared individual and group decisions involving risk. He presented groups of management students with 12 scenarios involving hypothetical individuals faced with decisions involving uncertainty. An example is:
A man with a severe heart ailment must seriously curtail his customary way of life if he does not wish to undergo a medical operation which might cure him completely or might prove fatal.
For each scenario, the students were given a list of odds that the risky action would be successful and they were asked to check to the lowest odds in the list that would cause them to advise the hypothetical individual to pursue the risky strategy. The students were then 20 allowed to deliberate the matters in groups. Stoner found that the groups'decisions were not the average of the students'original decisions. Instead, and surprisingly, for ten out of the twelve hypothetical scenarios, the groups'decisions were riskier; in the other two scenarios the groups'decisions were less risky. Stoner called the phenomenon of a group being willing to accept greater risk after deliberation a risky shift. Stoner's results led to a vast number of additional studies: in most of -although not all of -the given scenarios, groups would accept more risk than individuals.
Researchers soon realised that the outcome where the group was more cautious than its members had been before deliberation occurred for scenarios where, before deliberation, the individual members had favoured more cautious decisions than than they did for the other scenarios. Thus, when the individual members of the group were predisposed toward caution, group deliberation led to a choice that was more cautious than than the mean predeliberation choice of the group. This led Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) to propose the group-polarization hypothesis.
Moscovici and Zavalloni examined French students'attitudes toward their president and toward the United States and found that pre-discussion attitudes were positive toward the president and negative toward the United States; deliberation made their views more positive and more negative respectively. Following over 300 hundred studies on this phenomenon, it is now an accepted empirical regularity that group deliberation tends to result in a mean opinion that is more extreme than the group's mean original position. 13 Janis (1982) , who studied US foreign policy disasters, groupthink occurs when a committee is su¢ ciently cohesive that members'striving for consensus causes them to stop giving due consideration to alternatives.
Janis argued that groupthink is facilitated by structural faults in committees: insulation from outsiders; a lack of diversity in opinions and view points; tolerance of decisions which have not been methodically analysed; leaders who have actively advocated solutions. Group cohesiveness contributes by surpressing internal dissension. External stress, in the form of pressure from some external agent, also plays a role.
Whyte (1993) tested for the existence of a variant of groupthink by studying escalating commitment to a losing course of action. He had 200 graduate students and 125 senior undergraduate students who were studying organizational behaviour make decisions about allocating resources to a failing project. He found that group decision making ampli…ed trends apparent at the individual level in terms of both frequency and severity. It is more di¢ cult to test the signi…cance of the factors explaining groupthink and available evidence does not completely support the Janis's entire model. 17 Nevertheless, the framework has remained popular with psychologists and political scientists for interpreting real world …as-cos. 18 While the welfare e¤ect of group polarisation is unclear, the damaging e¤ect of groupthink is obvious. The solution to groupthink is to get group members to stop thinking and behaving as group members and to encourage outside examination of the group's decision-making process. The Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee is an example of how this can be done. Group members are encouraged to act as individuals: there is no obvious attempt at consensus. Members'votes are published; membership in the group is rotated; published minutes allow external scrutiny of the ideas and arguments considered; a portion of the group is made up of external members from outside of the Bank of England. The Governing
Council of the ECB -with its emphasis on secrecy and consensus -contrasts. The President of the ECB insists that consensus usually prevails; 19 Janis listed an illusion of unanimity as one of groupthink's symptoms.
Conclusion
This review paper has focussed on two aspects of groups and their importance for monetary policy making. First, what is the optimal size for a monetary policy committtee? A larger group has more resources and hence a better quality potential output. This suggests that larger committees are better than smaller ones. On the other hand, the discrepancy between actual and potential output may rise with group size. The economics literature provides the reasons for the motivational losses and coordination failures that produce this result. The literature from the other social sciences provides empirical support. It is thus argued that a reasonable size for a monetary policy committee is about …ve and that committees that are 18 See Parks and Sanna (1999) for a discussion of this. See also Smith (1985) for a study of groupthink and the Iranian hostage rescue mission and Hensley and Gri¤en (1986) for a study of groupthink and the Kent State University's disastrous decision to extend its gymnasium over parat of the area where students and Ohio National Guard members confronted each other in 1970 19 See, for example, President Duisenberg's comments during the November 2000 monetary dialogue between the President of the ECB and the Committee on Economic and Monetary A¤airs of the European Parliament.
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signi…cantly larger may not be as e¤ective.
Second, are committees more moderate than individual policy makers? While the pooling of views and information may tend to make committees more middle-of-the-road than individuals, the literature from social psychology suggests that committees may polarize their members. Thus, it is possible that committees are more extreme. A possible consequence is that they may be more apt to make horrendous decisions than their members.
There are other aspects of group behaviour that have been studied extensively in the social psychology literature, but which have received little attention in the debate on monetary committees and which are not addressed here. These include the role of the chairman, the way that the committee makes decisions and the question of how groups should deliberate.
